On this, if your threat model includes the state-level actors, it seems like you ought to be using a secure OS like Graphene, no?
If you are using Signal, and you are doing something the government considers illegal, the way they are going to read your messages about it is they will arrest the person you sent the messages *to*, and make your counterparty show them the logs. We know this because this technique came up again and again in, for example, the Jan. 6 court filings.There may, hypothetically, be other Signal exploits available to a government, but this is the one they will use, because it works.
mcc
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mcc
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Nathan
in reply to mcc • — (Chicago, Illinois, USA) •@mcc I may have used that term without properly understanding its meaning. My thinking was that if arrest is a possibility, it may make sense to use something like Graphene. I imagined that by using an OS without potential Google / Apple backdoors, that has strong device encryption, police may not be able to gain access to the device and, at least in the US, fifth amendment protections would prevent them from compelling you to provide a password. But I am just postulating; I absolutely do not know what I am talking about on this stuff.
But yea, I hear you on the levels. I'm sure with adequate budget anyone can get whatever they like from you.
mcc
in reply to Nathan • • •It is my expectation¹ that an up-to-date Apple device with device encryption and with reasonable settings (IE, Face ID off) would be resistant to being broken into by conventional law enforcement. If "intelligence" services can break into such phones it is probably by methods they don't want to expose to the probing eye of a court.
¹ I do not know if this is still true in the Apple Intelligence era.
mcc
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