On Friday October 9th, German journalist Gavin Karlmeier released the latest episode of his podcast “Haken dran” and shared an exclusive scoop: an anonymous source discovered that the social media company W Social is publishing to the world wide web the legal names, nationalities and approximate dates of birth of their verified users, in plain text. This information is viewable by anyone with an internet connection and can be easily downloaded as a .csv file by people with a bit of tech savvy.
youtube.com/embed/vBWzwZIiH94?…
When approached by Karlmeier, W Social representatives responded that this is not an unauthorized data leak, but rather, that the information “public by design” and allegedly shared with the informed consent of their users.
Interestingly, nearly all the promotional materials and public communications by W Social and W Identity up to now stated the exact opposite, giving the impression that government ID data provided to verify one’s account would be immediately deleted - and that it would be impossible to link one’s real identity (shared with W Identity) to one’s social profile (shared with W Social).
My research into this topic has surfaced troubling examples of a potential breach of trust and privacy of W Social users, as well as glaring contradictions and false promises by W Social leaders.
Before we get started unpacking all this, I must make a disclosure: my research and reporting are entirely self-funded (with the help of family with childcare on Sunday). It’s important I share this, as W Social leaders doubled-down in public communications on social media, aggressively responding to critics asking “who is funding you?” and insinuating competing PDS owners may be conspiring to attack W Social.
No, the real story is much simpler: W Social has been mired in controversies of their own making (numerous tech and communications blunders) since their launch in Davos in January. I find the discrepancy between the media hype and reality fascinating, which is why I write about them. With this particular incident, I find it’s important to raise awareness about how W Social is treating their users’ data, as many are completely unaware that their information is now “open data” on the web.
A quick recap about W Social and W Identity
W Social is a European social media company that launched in Davos earlier this year, during the World Economic Forum. I have written a series of articles about them; if I were to recommend just one, it would be this:
The Untold Story About W Social: Unconventional Beginnings, Strategic Pitches and Conflicting Signals
A deep dive into the origin story of W Social, an analysis of the strategic arguments they have been using to appeal to government officials, media companies and advertisers... and the discussion of conflicting signals they have been sending
Elena RossiniElena Rossini
W Social is powered by ATproto and is thus federating with the rest of the “Atmosphere” (Bluesky, Eurosky, Blacksky, Northsky and other PDSs that run on ATproto).
W Social used open source code but quietly went closed source sometime in May of this year, à la Truth Social.
W Social is TruthSocial with a European accent. - We Can Just Do Things
Different politics, identical structure: wealthy insiders, community infrastructure they didn’t build, and openness performed just long enough to matter. The establishment always wants its own internet.
We Can Just Do ThingsB. Prendergast
W Social's unique selling proposition is that they are hosted and managed in Europe and they require government ID verification in order to post and use all the functionalities of the network (like translation tools, content moderation, or logging into their mobile app). On their official website they state:
We believe in the need for a global, trusted social media platform owned, run, and hosted in Europe. W is built on verified human users, transparency, privacy, and free speech.
W Social’s PDS (Personal Data Server) holds about 47 thousand accounts (as of October 13, 2026) but that number doesn’t tell the full story: only about 10300 people have verified their accounts with government IDs and to this day, only about 4289 (as of October 13, 2026) have ever published a single post or reply.
In order to verify one’s account with government ID, a user has to go through a 13-step verification process using the app W Identity:
Elena Rossini on GoToSocial ⁂ (@elena@aseachange.com)
How to create an account on #WSocial in 13 easy steps: 1️⃣ choose a username 2️⃣ choose a password 3️⃣ choose your interests 4️⃣ download the #WIdentity app to your phone (two options: Apple AppStore or Google Play Store) 5️⃣ scan a QR code 6️⃣ create a PIN code optional: enable biometrics; re-enter PIN 7️⃣ choose whether you simply want to verify that you’re human or if you also want to verify your name 8️⃣ choose the verification method (automatic photo review, request a manual review or scan your passport chip) 9️⃣ scan your passport’s picture page 1️⃣0️⃣ scan your passport’s chip 1️⃣1️⃣ take a selfie 1️⃣2️⃣ scan a QR code to link the W Identity to your W Social account 1️⃣3️⃣ enter your PIN code Congratulations, you’re verified*! (* for two years) Demonstration in all its simple glory here: 📺 : https://inv.nadeko.net/Vcq4MiabpEQ Please save this toot as reference if you ever hear somebody say that IT’S TOO COMPLICATED TO JOIN THE FEDIVERSE BECAUSE YOU NEED TO PICK A SERVER 🤡 #SocialMedia
aseachange.comElena Rossini on GoToSocial ⁂ , elena (open profile)
W Identity’s app reviews on the German Google Play store are disastrous with an average of 1.1 stars out of 5 and 268 reviews (to this day) that lament being unable to go through verification because the passport scan fails to work.
Many prospective W Social users end up reaching out to support via email and verifying their identity via a video call. Please keep in mind this detail because it will come back later, in a relevant way.
The CEO of W Social is Anna Zeiter, whose previous role was “Chief Privacy Officer” at eBay Inc. Zeiter is also a lawyer and professor at the University of Bern, holding classes in European Data Law. I believe Zeiter was approached and offered the role of CEO of W Social because of her background in law and privacy, as a way to reassure prospective W Social users that their data would be safe in the hands of W Social and W Identity. This is what made the recent revelations so startling.
The Haken Dran Revelations: “Public by Design”
In his podcast Karlmeier said:
I confronted W Social about the [public] list and asked: ‘Can you tell us anything about it? How are you handling it? Could this be a breach of the General Data Protection Regulation, the GDPR? Could it be a mistake? Did you change something on September 19 [sic] that caused this list to appear? Is this even what you want?’ W Social replied: ‘This is public by design.’ They say that this is how it’s meant to work: they want a public network, and because it’s based on an open protocol, the data is public too. In their statement, they also said they’re planning to release a new app where this data may also be visible—namely, the birth name and birth year.
This is an interesting twist, as I have been closely following W Social since their controversial launch in Davos in late January 2026 and virtually all their messaging about government ID data and how it was handled was very different.
I cannot recall a single instance of anyone at W Social stating that the full names, birth years and nationalities of their verified users would be collected in a public list that would be readily accessible to anyone with an internet connection.
It would have made sense if the information would have remained within the confines of W Social, displayed to logged in users.
What makes this development so sensational is that thousands of verified W Social users, who consented to have their names, nationalities and years of birth shown inside W Social now have that information collected outside of the network, in a public list, in plain text, on the open web, and easily downloadable for anyone with modest development skills (or inclined to enlist the help of an AI assistant). So basically, anyone.
This is how the data of verified W Social users appears online, on the website pdsls.dev (I'm not sharing a direct link to the list on purpose):
This is how the data of verified W Social users appears in a .csv file:
a screenshot of how verification data appears in a .csv file. details have been anonymized but there is the identifier DID, a column for first names, one for last names, one for nationalities and one for approximate birthdays starting with the year
The .csv file has columns listing an account's decentralized identifier (did), the date of verification, the type of account (personal, bot, organization or test), first names ("given"), last names ("family"), nationalities, approximate birth dates (starting with the year), amongst other fields.
Claims made in March 2026: “W Social and W Identity are completely separate and do not share user data”
a still image from Jan Lindblad's presentation showing the separation between W Identity and W Social
In a presentation at AtmosphereConf in Vancouver in March 2026, the lead developer at W Social Jan Lindblad explained how W Social and W Identity work:
We’re building the whole system around two separate domains. One part is run by a separate company and is called W Identity. It scans your passport and stores information about who you are locally on your phone. It will know your nationality, birth date, and full name. In some countries, it will know your social security number. It will have a photo of your face, but it won’t share that information with W Social. W Social is a separate app and a separate company. It knows about your online life—your posts, friends, likes, and so on—but it won’t know who you are. The only thing that links the two is this UUID: a 32-digit random number, basically. On the W Identity side, you’ll know that someone is human, but not who they are on social media. On W Social, you’ll know that someone is a real human, but not who they are. We’re also planning to share someone’s nationality and birth year, although we’re not doing that right now.
youtube.com/embed/hQye2P45jHE?…
The “two separate companies” claim has been debunked in the past, as both W Social and W Identity share the same address and the same people on their board. I knew that it was Trust Anchor Group that was subcontracted to do the identity verification on behalf of W Social, so I never put too much thought into it. But the recent revelations about how their verified users’ data is handled is casting doubt on every single statement made about the two companies.
In the screenshot of the .csv file I shared earlier, you can see the “did” information of each user that precedes their first and last names. All you have to do to find out their username on W Social is to copy and paste the did into a website like atproto.at. It is therefore misleading - in my opinion - to claim that account information and real identities are separate. All the information is combined and easily searchable.
Claims made in May 2026: “government ID data only stays on one’s device and is immediately deleted from W Social’s servers”
W Social CEO Anna Zeiter was a guest on Gavin Karlmeier’s podcast in May and back then she made some statements that contradict the current situation.
youtube.com/embed/3JFSnGneiAM?…
On May 15th, Anna Zeiter said (starting at 52:30):
There is a great deal of pushback, particularly because some people misunderstand the issue. They get the impression that “we need everyone’s IDs and then store them, but it isn’t clear what purposes they’re being stored for.” What we want to know is: Are the people coming to us human, and are they over 18? It’s like checking people at the entrance to a club: Are you a human, and are you over 18?
Zeiter continued:
We don’t store the data afterward. We don’t want to build a government database of identity documents. The less data a company has, the less data there is that can be lost. It’s not in my interest to store people’s ID data, because that could eventually lead to a data breach—something we obviously don’t want.
Zeiter explained how ID verification works:
This service is provided by the Trust Anchor Group through the W Identity app. The provider only tells us: “User 123 has just signed in, and User 123 is a human.” All I see is an encrypted token—an encrypted hash token—that cannot, so to speak, be reverse-engineered. So if law enforcement, the FBI, or the CIA were to come to me one day and say, “User 123 has made critical comments about Trump. Who is User 123?”, I could say, “Look at my servers. There’s nothing to be found there.” On the service provider’s side—the Trust Anchor Group—the data is deleted shortly after verification. That is the promise, at least initially: Nothing is stored.
You can imagine that having watched these videos, I was really surprised by the recent revelations that certain identifying details like full legal names, nationalities and approximate date of birth are not only stored but also published on the web for anyone to see.
ATproto developer Kuba Suder astutely pointed out that there is no option to make one's nationality and approximate age private; a requirement of W Identity verification is to always display these two pieces of information, whereas using a real name is optional.
After thinking about this over and over for several days, I am now wondering if the sentence "we don't store ID data" refers to users' passport numbers - which could very well be immediately deleted from Trust Anchor Group's servers. So maybe when Zeiter said "ID information stays on one's phone" this referred to a passport number? Because otherwise there is no way to explain how a user's DID (decentralized identifier), first name, last name, nationality and approximate birthday are all collected in one place.
Claims from October 2026: "it’s a feature (not a leak)!"
5 hours after Gavin Karlmeier’s podcast went live with the scoop that identifying data of verified W Social users was being published in the clear in the Atmosphere, the official W Social account posted a thread:
W Social (@wsocial.eu)
1/5 We’ve upgraded W’s verified badge to give you more context about the person behind the keyboard. Real humans. More trust. Your real name stays optional.
Bluesky SocialW Social (@wsocial.eu)
We’ve upgraded W’s verified badge to give you more context about the person behind the keyboard. Real humans. More trust. Your real name stays optional.
And:
Click the ID icon on a profile to see:
• Verified name, if the person chose to share it
• Age range
• Nationality used for verification
You chose what to share during verification. The upgraded badge now displays those details.
They continued:
3/5
Keep your real name private and still be a verified human. W Social receives your real name only if you choose to share it, and your birth year and nationality, never your exact birthdate. Your profile only shows an age range. All users agree to what is shared publicly during verification.
The timing of this announcement (without addressing directly Karlmeier’s revelations) was fascinating.
As I mentioned earlier, anyone can download W Social’s verification list as a .csv file. There are now over 10 thousand verification records for W Social but the ones revealing the full name, nationality and approximate birth date of users are recent. The first full record showed up on September 17th, 2026 at 10:59am.
So this so-called “intentional feature” had been out for over 3 weeks but it has been officially acknowledged and announced only hours after the scoop by Gavin Karlmeier on his podcast. At the risk of editorializing, I’m not sure I would call this the proper way to do corporate communications or data handling.
After hearing the revelations shared on the Haken Dran podcast, I posted the following message on the Atmosphere:
Dear friends who don't speak German: Go to YouTube ASAP, turn on subtitles → autogenerated translation and watch this video! TL;DR: #WSocial is posting legal names, nationalities and approx. birthdays of verified users as a public record on the Atmosphere. Confronted, they claim it's "by design" 🤯
The official W Social account replied to my post with this message:
“Public verification details are available to other AT Protocol communities, just like public posts and profiles. W is an open network: the context users agree to publish travels with their profile. Only your age range is public, never your birth year or exact date of birth.”
Problem is, when you look at the “Approximate Birth Date” details on the .cvs file, there is an approximate birth year. W Social says the real date is +/- 12 months, in a 24-month range. So the information they share is quite specific:
a screenshot of how verification data appears in a .csv file. details have been anonymized but there is the identifier DID, a column for first names, one for last names, one for nationalities and one for approximate birthdays starting with the year
Anonymous users & public records
Assuming that what W Social representatives are saying is true and that they have the full informed consent of their users in sharing their first name, last name, approximate date of birth and nationality as a public record on the open web, well, there are still some puzzling elements to consider.
Examining the full list of public records of verified accounts, I found several instances where a person had used a pseudonym for their username and display name… but their legal first and last name were visible in the public verification list. By several I mean: over a dozen, just by doing a casual check. I'm using a made up example, so I don't further expose people who are unaware their details are out: imagine an Italian user who has "Calimero" as his username and diplay name on W Social, but in the public verification list, there are additional fields for his full name, revealing he's "Mario Rossi", born in 1975. The information displayed on W Social make me think he values privacy, but because of the list, I now know identifying details about him.
I wonder: are W Social verified users aware that their personal details (first name, last name, nationality and approx. birthday) are being shared OUTSIDE of W Social and published as a permanent record on the web, in plain text?
Sloppy note-taking? A second birthday in the name field
Remember how earlier I wrote that manual verifications are the most common method of verification because the W Identity app does not work for most users?
I have found evidence in the .csv download of “sloppy” note taking, with at least 5 accounts that have a full birthday next to the person’s last name - a different birthday compared to the one in the “approx. birth date” field, which could very well be the real birthday of the person concerned… where the manual verifier potentially forgot to delete the data.
a screenshot showing the .csv file with real names, nationalities and approx. birthdays of verified users; there is a second birthday in the name field for one person (same year as the approx. birthday)
I also found 8 records with digits next to a person’s last name; I suspect they may be fragments from the real birthday of the user concerned (the day of the month they were born, as some go up to 24)… a detail that the person doing the manual verification forgot to delete.
Public reactions
Public reactions to these revelations have been widespread condemnation of the nonchalant way that W Social is treating this matter.
The official account of Fedica, a social media management company, replied to one of the W Social comments with this post:
We've been doing social media analytics for well over a decade, no other social media platform provided public age data per account like this Facebook has user_birthday but users must authorize the app to read their own data, not of any account! Have we not learned anything from Cambridge Analytica
And Fedica’s founder doubled-down with a post stating: “I am sorry, but what
@wsocial.eu is doing here is very irresponsible.”
Could a different technical implementation preserve the privacy of W Social’s users?
As soon as I learned about this implementation that exposes the private data of verified users to the world wide web, I began wondering: was there another, better way to do things?
Several developers commented that if the information had been posted on W Social’s own AppView, available only for those inside their networks, this “leak that’s not a leak” would have been mitigated. But others replied that there could still have been ways to download and disseminate the data.
I reached out to an experienced ATproto developer asking for a comment about this matter; they wished to remain anonymous and shared these thoughts:
For me, the main issue is that having this kind of feature where you can make your full name, age, and nationality public is inherently dangerous, regardless of how exactly it's implemented technically. Even on Bluesky, a lot of users aren't initially aware how much of their data (including e.g. their likes and blocks) is public and can be browsed on other sites. From what I have seen, a lot of W Social users aren't aware that they're a part of the same network as Bluesky and are surprised to see Bluesky users reading their posts and replying to them. This implies that W isn't doing a good job of explaining to their users how the system works and who can see their data, so I have a strong suspicion that the users would also be surprised to hear that anyone outside of W can also see their full name and nationality.
Thorny GDPR questions
Does W Social have the informed consent of their users when it comes to sharing their full legal names, nationalities and approximate date of birth on the world wide web?
Is the current technical implementation by W Social and W Identity a GDPR violation? German writer and podcaster Sascha Pallenberg has explored these questions in a recently released article:
W Social: Verifiziert heisst veroeffentlicht
Das europaeische Netzwerk verspricht Anonymitaet trotz Ausweispflicht. Seine eigenen Datensaetze erzaehlen etwas anderes. Und die DSGVO hat dazu eine ziemlich klare Meinung. Analyse eines Privacy Fails, der auch die EU-Kommission betreffen duerfte! Wsocial Fail - Wenn Datenschutz kein Feature ist! | MeTacheles Tonspur🚨 W Socials Privacy-Fail! Anonym versprochen, halbes Profil
MeTachelesSascha Pallenberg
When I shared Sascha's article on Mastodon, a follower sent me a private message and told me that they (I'm using the "they" pronoun to safeguard their privacy) had tried to reach out to W Social's DPO (data protection officer) multiple times in order to receive clarifications about how user data would have been handled. They had to send several queries because their original message was never replied to. Finally, 2 months and 4 messages later, the DPO of W Social replied:
Hello [redacted],
On recipients: we share data with processors under data processing agreements, covering hosting, email, identity verification, and support. Trust Anchor Group AB is the processor supporting our verification infrastructure and handle manual reviews where automatic checks can't complete.
On international transfers: we don't currently have any transfers of personal data outside the EEA — processing and storage stay within the EEA. Should that change, we'd only transfer data under an appropriate safeguard (an EU Commission adequacy decision or the Standard Contractual Clauses, plus supplementary measures where needed), in line with GDPR Chapter V.
It's worth emphasizing this sentence: "we don't currently have any transfers of personal data outside the EEA — processing and storage stay within the EEA." EEA stands for European Economic Area. And the statement fails to address that open data means that records are published in the clear on the open web, available for all to see, in any country around the world.
The message was sent in late August and W Social began to publish ID information on their repository in mid-September. Could this be the cause of the misalignment? Was the W Social DPO unaware that identifying information would have been published on the world wide web in the near future?
So many unanswered questions. I'm eager to see what the official response by W Social will be. For now they have simply posted a vague message on the Atmosphere stating:
W is currently facing a wave of criticism that mixes false accusations, disinformation, distorted facts with legitimate questions. We will publish a detailed memo in due course to address the claims and set out the facts.
Thanks for being here,
Elena
W Social, Public Institutions and the Theater of European Digital Sovereignty
In the past few months I have unwittingly become an expert on all things W Social: the microblogging platform that is a fork of Bluesky and bills itself as Europe’s alternative to X, with identity verification “to fight bots and misinformation” and data hosted in Europe “to promote European digital sovereignty”. Why am I fascinated by this topic? I find the discrepancies between their public image and the reality behind the scenes truly striking.
Over the course of the past few days I have received sensational information that no media organization has so far reported. So here we go, with another article about W Social on their big week, as they are set to open their public beta to their waiting list later today.
But first: if you missed my previous articles on the topic, you can find them here:
W Social - Elena Rossini
A series of articles about the controversial social network W Social, a for profit company set up by Swedish entrepreneurs, who openly admitted they want to help train European AI models with their users’ data (amongst other things).
Elena RossiniElena Rossini
⚠️
Disclaimer:
This article represents my personal opinions, commentary, and conclusions formed through independent research using publicly available sources. Any characterizations, interpretations, or inferences are presented as opinion, not as statements of objective fact. Readers are encouraged to review the referenced materials and draw their own conclusions.
Prominent Institutions and Government Officials Move their Accounts to W Social
On Friday June 12th I received a tip: that the ATproto accounts of the European Commission, its president Ursula von der Leyen, the European Central Bank and its president Christine Lagarde had been migrated from Bluesky PBC to W Social’s servers.
I immediately double-checked the information on the website clearsky.app (which indexes information about ATproto) and saw this for myself:
screenshots from the website clearsky.app which show how the Bluesky accounts of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen and Christine Lagarde were very recently moved to W Social's servers
I was incredibly surprised by this move: W Social is a private, for-profit enterprise controlled by Swedish entrepreneurs which had a really spotty launch and isn’t forthcoming with communications about their tech stack.
Europe already has an ATproto social network - Eurosky - run by a non-profit foundation - Modal - that is building everything in the open, with full transparency, sharing all the steps in their development roadmap:
Development Roadmap - Eurosky
Eurosky is a European initiative to build and operate sovereign social web infrastructure
Eurosky
Last week Eurosky shared news about their strides in attaining greater independence from Bluesky PBC’s infrastructure: they are now mirroring the did:plc directory and set up their own firehose running on European infrastructure; they even launched a new platform/webapp - mu.social - that is a full replacement of the Bluesky app.
If these concepts sound foreign to you, let me attempt to explain things in plain terms. Social networks powered by ATproto are built on composable, modular services that can be independently hosted. To be fully sovereign you need:
- your own Personal Data Server (PDS), which stores user accounts, posts, likes, follows, profile data and also handles identity and signing keys;
- a relay, which aggregates messages from PDS instances and makes them available to AppViews as a data stream;
- an AppView, which indexes data from relays and provides a search engine;
- a moderation service, which manages labels, blocks and mutes;
- a PLC (Public Key Infrastructure), which maps usernames to public identities.
While self-hosting an ATproto Personal Data Server is now relatively easy and affordable, running the other components requires great resources and technical expertise.
W Social has made promises of hosting their users’ data in Europe but they haven’t been forthcoming about their roadmap and whether or not they are relying on Bluesky PBC’s infrastructure for the other services.
Thus my surprise when I heard about the migration of such prominent institutional accounts. Had they done due diligence, I wondered?
Exclusive: W Social may have quietly become closed-source
Then on Saturday I received another tip. Someone wrote to me:
W Social have taken down the public repo of their app: github.com/w-social-eu. You can still look at the last state from early March in the archive, but right now it's no longer public. That means that the European Commission has factually migrated their data from an open source platform (Bluesky) into a closed source platform (W Social).
I immediately checked GitHub as well as Codeberg and other Git platforms and could not find any traces of W Social (even after trying alternate spellings).
a screenshot showing the missing W Social repo from GitHub (left) and how it used to look when it was online (right) last captured on March 9th
This was another surprising piece of news in the context of the recent unveiling of the Tech Sovereignty Package by the European Commission.
In their announcement on June 3 (only a week before the account move to W Social), the European Commission had expressed the desire to “[strengthen] Europe’s tech sovereignty” via a European technological sovereignty package that focused on four core areas. The third area is:
Strengthening digital autonomy through open source – the open source strategy will scale up open source alternatives in priority areas, invest in skills, start-ups and digital infrastructure, and support greater use of open source in public administrations.
Strengthening Europe’s tech sovereignty
Learn about Commission’s plans to make Europe an AI leader and more digitally self-reliant, by strengthening its capacity for semiconductors, AI, cloud and open source
Directorate-General for CommunicationDirectorate-General for Communication
I wonder if the person in charge of the European Commission’s ATproto account migrations knew that W Social has quietly gone closed-source?
European Big Tech?
I contacted Aral Balkan, the co-founder of the Small Technology Foundation, asking him to help me unpack this news.
According to Balkan, the move by the W Social developers - deleting their code from GitHub - is highly unusual:
The standard practice is to deprecate the old repo and put up a message telling people where the new one is. Not delete it.
Balkan continued:
It’s very concerning if the removal of their public repository signals that W Social is taking their implementation closed source. Furthermore, I couldn’t find the source of their web client and mobile apps on their GitHub either. There have been so many red flags with W Social since its hastily cobbled-together announcement at Davos that they might as well make a red flag their logo.
For context, the repositories of Bluesky and its forks Eurosky and Blacksky are all publicly available on GitHub... and W Social's repository was as well, until some time in March.
GitHub - w-social-eu/w-social-atproto: Social networking technology created by Bluesky
Social networking technology created by Bluesky. Contribute to w-social-eu/w-social-atproto development by creating an account on GitHub.
GitHubw-social-eu
It was simply removed without any notice.
Balkan then addressed the issue of identity verification - which is required by W Social:
It’s very concerning – but again, not surprising – to see folks from the European Commission jumping on this particular bandwagon. Especially given the commission’s push for identity verification (under the guise of age verification – as lobbied for by Meta) and W Social’s plans to make identity verification a core part of their system. My fear is that W Social is just another for-profit Big Tech startup that happens to be based in the EU. We don’t need that. We don’t need more European surveillance capitalists and people farmers. We need ethical alternatives working for the common good.
Indeed, there is plenty of evidence showing how leaders from the world of Big Tech are connected to W Social.
In my previous article about the company I had only mentioned one person who is on their Board of Advisors: Yariv Adan, a former AI lead at Alphabet (Google). But the full picture of their advisory board is very telling, as it comprises prominent people from the world of European politics as well as Big Tech executives.
a screenshot of a conference slide showing W Social's advisory board
Marc Placzek in particular is an interesting choice: he was a Chief Privacy Officer at Paypal (a company co-founded by tech oligarch Peter Thiel), and he currently serves this role at Tools for Humanity (a company co-founded by another tech oligarch: OpenAI CEO Sam Altman). What is Tools for Humanity's mission? To “create a global ID, a global currency, and an app enabling payment with World's own digital token” with irises scanned to verify one’s identity.
Tools for Humanity
Tools for Humanity is a technology company building for humans in the age of AI.
Tools for HumanityTools for Humanity
For more information on Tools for Humanity and World(coin):
youtube.com/embed/9vcpuBoiyAQ?…
Questions for European public institutions on W Social
I have so many questions that I wish I could address to people working at European public institutions who now have ATproto accounts on W Social.
Here are my top 3:
- Are you aware that the W Social network may have become closed-source?
- Do you know if all the components in W Social’s ATproto stack are self-hosted in Europe (not just their PDS, but also their relay, AppView and moderation)?
- Why didn’t you move to Eurosky instead?
I am curious to see how the beta launch of W Social will go today. And which other prominent accounts will join them.
Elena
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